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provided in Sections 57-1-25 and 57-1-26.
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RESPONSE TO ISSUES IN BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RJW MEDIA
COULD NOT ESTABLISH THE MALICE ELEMENT OF THEIR
SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The trial court correctly granted CIT's motion for summary judgment on

RJW Media's slander of title claim because RJW Media failed, as a matter of law,
to present sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that CIT acted in malice.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law/' Dairyland
Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Utah 1994)
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In considering a motion for summary judgment,
"there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is
merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986).
To determine whether the nonmoving party has produced evidence in its
favor sufficient to preclude summary judgment, trial courts must consider the
evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party is required to meet at trial:
Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the
evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.
. . . The question here is whether a jury could reasonably find either that the
plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by
the governing law or that he did not. Whether a jury could reasonably find
for either party, however, cannot be defined except by the criteria
governing what evidence would enable the jury to find for either the
plaintiff or the defendant. . . these standards and boundaries are in fact
provided by the applicable evidentiary standards.
7

Id. at 254.
In summary, " . . . the trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as to whether a
genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury1
applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or
the defendant." Id. at 255. Under this inquiry, the trial court was correct in
holding:
Plaintiffs claim is indeed "colorable" but not sufficient to this court that
this court believes a reasonable trier of fact (this court) could find the filing
of the notice was with malice, express or implied. Given the burden [RJW
Media] bears to prove slander of title . . . the evidence provided by [RJW
Media] cannot show malice. Thus, as a matter of law, [CIT] is entitled to
judgment.
R. 693-94. The trial court correctly refrained from taking on the role of the trier of
fact and of viewing the evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences based upon
the evidence, in a light most favorable to CIT. Indeed, its holding confirms that in
spite of viewing the evidence and any reasonable inferences based upon the

1

In a bench trial, the court would naturally have to substitute itself for the jury.
The trial court emphasized the fact that this was a bench trial. "Again, here the
court will be the trier of fact. It is not NOW the trier of fact in this motion, but
will be at trail. That normally would not matter for purposes of such a motion but
in this case the court believes that it does matter." R. 692 (emphasis in original).
The trial court was correct in its belief that its position as the future "trier of fact"
was important in light of the Supreme Court's summary judgment guidance that
"there is no genuine issue if the evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of
insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual
malice." Id at 266. Thus, in looking forward to its future role as the "rational
finder of fact," the trial court was in a position where it had to determine whether
or not it felt that the evidence presented by RJW Media was of sufficient caliber or
quantity to allow itself, anticipating its role at the rational finder of fact, to find
malice on the part of CIT.
8

evidence in RJW Media's favor, the trial court found that a jury could not
reasonably find that CIT published its Notice of Default in malice because RJW
Media's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.
A.

The Trial Court Correctly Held That No Reasonable Fact-finder
Could Determine That CIT Acted With Malice.

In Utah, a slander of title claim consists of four elements: (1) a publication
of a slanderous statement (2) that is false and (3) made with malice (4) that causes
actual or special damages. Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d
566, 568 (Utah 1988), Jack B. Parsons Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1134
(Utah 1988), Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956, 958 (1949), See also
McNichols v. Coneios-K Corp., 482 P.2d 432, 434 (1971), Cardon v. McConnel
27 S.E. 109 (1897), See generally 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 541 (1970).
Additionally, u[m]alice may be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully
records or publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or
misleading impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that it should
reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property." First
Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989).
The trial court correctly found that RJW Media failed as a matter of law to
present sufficient "evidence" for "a reasonable fact finder" to conclude that CIT's
'Tiling of the notice was with malice, express or implied." R. 693-94. In support
of its slander of title claim, RJW Media relies upon the following facts:
(1) CIT recorded a Notice of Default on the Property even though it knew
RJW Media's Trustee's Sale of the Property already had occurred; (2) CIT
9

refused to withdraw that Notice of Default after RJW Media asked CIT to
do so and even after the trial court had quieted title of the property to RJW
Media; (3) CIT published a statement; and (4) RJW Media suffered actual
or special damages as a result of that publication.
Appellant's Brief, p. 31.
Additionally, RJW Media incorrectly claims that "it is undisputed that CIT
published a false statement'' [Appellant's Brief p. 32] when it filed its Notice of
Default. On the contrary, the evidence and rulings of the trial court suggest that
CIT did not publish a false statement. The trial court found that the Notice of
Cancellation filed by First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah was valid. R. 53233. The natural consequence of the filing of a valid Notice of Cancellation is that
the Notice of Default upon which RJW Media relied to conduct its Trustee's Sale
was invalid. Under Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-24, "[t]he power of sale
conferred upon the trustee . . . may not be exercised until: (1) the trustee first files
for record . . . a notice of default, (emphasis added). When RJW Media conducted
its Trustee's Sale, there was no valid Notice of Default. Because the RJW Media
Trustee's Sale was carried out contrary to the express language of the Utah statute
upon which the power of sale is predicated, CIT's interest in the Property was not
eliminated. Thus, the Notice of Default filed by CIT was not a false statement.
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence showing CIT's notice of default was
a false statement, RJW Media asks the Court to imply malice exclusively from the
publication of a false statement, i.e. CIT's notice of default. Appellants Brief p.
33. By asking the Court to accept one element as proof of another, is to eliminate

10

the requirement of malice all together, and exposes the lack of probative evidence
available for proof of RJW Media's Slander of Title claim.
RJW Media also places great importance in the proposition that "a trustee's
sale is presumed valid unless the sale's opponent produces evidence to the
contrary." Appellant's Brief p. 33. RJW Media expands on its use of the
presumption when it argues, "a reasonable fact-finder could determine that a
mortgage company with CIT's status and experience knew that the trustee's sale
was presumed valid, that CIT knew that it had no legal right to file its CIT Notice
of Default without first setting aside the trustee's sale..." Appellant's Brief p. 34.
Although RJW Media provides no authority for these conclusions, the use of the
presumption as evidence is inappropriate.
The Utah Supreme Court has held "[t]he main purpose of presumptions is
to shift the burden either of producing evidence or of persuasion and thereby make
sure that the evidence showing the basic facts will be held sufficient to support a
finding for the favored party if the disfavored party fails to satisfy his burden.
This does not mean that the fact finder may consider or weigh the presumption as
evidence:' Massey v. Griffiths, 152 P.3d 312, 314 (Utah 2007). Despite the fact
that the presumption that RJW Media's Trust Sale was valid should not be
considered as evidence by the fact finder, CIT has already presented uncontested
evidence that the trustee's sale was invalid. RJW Media's reliance on the
presumption of validity is thus misplaced.

11

Finally, RJW Media asserts as "fact" that "CIT subsequently issued a notice
of default as part of a scheme to cloud RJW Media's title and force RJW Media to
capitulate to CIT's demands." Appellant's Brief p. 33. Despite the time afforded
to RJW Media to sequester documents and to depose witnesses, RJW Media failed
to produce any evidence of its colorable claim that CIT's conduct was part of a
"scheme to cloud RJW Media's title."
With RJW Media's evidence in mind, the question presented to the Court is
whether a reasonable fact finder could find that the evidence was sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact in regard to whether CIT published its
Notice of Default with actual or implied malice.
RJW Media does not argue that CIT acted with actual malice, and RJW
Media's claim that CIT acted with implied malice is not supported by the
evidence. Malice may only be implied where "a party knowingly and wrongfully
records or publishes something untrue .. . ." Howarth v. Ostergaard, 515 P.2d
442, 444 (Utah 1973). Whether or not CIT's Notice of Default is wrongful is a
question of law. As discussed above, there was nothing "wrongful" in the filing of
CIT's Notice of Default because its interest in the Property had not been
extinguished in accordance with Utah's statutory provisions. Because CIT's filing
of its Notice of Default was not "wrongful," malice may not be implied.

12

B.

The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Assume the Role of Trier
of Fact at Summary Judgment

RJW Media mistakenly claims that "[t]he trial court's ruling makes clear
that it disregarded the injunction against resolving factual disputes as a trier of fact
at the summary judgment stage." Appellant's Brief p. 34. Its claim is based on its
assertion that "the trial court overstepped its well-defined boundaries at summary
judgment by taking on the role of trier of fact, weighing the credibility of CIT's
stated 'belief that its Notice of Default was proper, and determining the
underlying intent of CIT in recording this Notice." Appellant's Brief p. 35.
To the contrary, the trial court's holding had nothing to do with a resolution
of a factual dispute between the parties concerning CIT's intent in filing its Notice
of Default. The holding was correctly based on RJW Media's failure to create a
factual dispute, which was due to its failure to present sufficient evidence to meet
its evidentiary burden concerning whether or not CIT acted with malice. R. 69394. The U.S. Supreme Court has held:
[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the
evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.
This conclusion is mandated by the nature of this determination. The
question here is whether a jury could reasonably find either that the
plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by
the governing law or that he did not. Whether a jury could reasonably find
for either party, however, cannot be defined except by the criteria
governing what evidence would enable the jury to find for either the
plaintiff or the defendant: It makes no sense to say that a jury could
reasonably find for either party without some benchmark as to what
standards govern its deliberations and within what boundaries its ultimate
decision must fall, and these standards and boundaries are in fact provided
by the applicable evidentiary standards.

13

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has advised that "there is no issue for trial
unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." LI at 243.
RJW Media's claim fails to recognize that there is a subtle difference
between (1) weighing the evidence of the moving and nonmoving parties and
concluding that one party's evidence is more persuasive than the other (the role of
the trier of fact) and (2) evaluating the evidence as a whole and determining that a
reasonable trier of fact could not rule in the nonmoving party's favor because the
evidence presented is insufficient as a matter of law. The former is proscribed on
a motion for summary judgment while the latter is required. In this case, the trial
court acted in accordance with the latter (as well as U.S. Supreme Court
precedent) in holding:
[T]he court does not believe [RJW Media's] evidence could amount to the
realistic probability that [the trier of fact] would find malice in the issuance
of the notice of default by CIT. .. . Given the burden [RJW Media] bears to
prove slander of title . . . the evidence provided by [RJW Media] cannot
show malice. Thus, as a matter of law, [CIT] is entitled to judgment."
R. 693-94.
Clearly, the trial court's holding was based on the fact that RJW Media failed to
present evidence that CIT acted with malice in filing its Notice of Default and had

Again, this was to be a bench trial and the trial court itself was to be the trier of
fact.
14

nothing to do with "weighing the credibility of CIT's stated 'belief that its Notice
of Default was proper." Appellant's Brief, p. 35.
Although, RJW asserts that it is "entitled to cross-examine CIT on its
motivation for filing the CIT Notice of Default," but was "deprived of that
constitutional right," Appellant's Brief, p. 35, RJW Media's presumption is
incorrect. First, RJW Media deposed CIT, and has not previously claimed it was
deprived of any constitutional right. Second, RJW Media has not identified and
evidence other than that before the Court which supports it claim for Slander of
Title; indeed, RJW Media simply objects to not being able to cross-examine a
witness it deposed without finding any evidence of actual or implied malice.
Third, if Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. stands for anything, it is that when a
party opposing a motion for summary judgment fails substantively to meet the
evidentiary burden that will be required at trial, the court should grant summary
judgment. RJW Media failed to meet its initial evidentiary burden to bring forth
"significantly probative" evidence that CIT acted maliciously in filing its notice of
default. Id at 250. Thus, RJW Media is not entitled to advance to trial and
summary judgment was proper.
In conclusion, there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute
concerning whether or not CIT acted with malice in filing its Notice of Default
because RJW Media failed to meet its evidentiary burden, which is based on the
"quality and quantity of evidence required by the governing law." Id. at 254. For
this reason, the court had no need to, and indeed did not assess the credibility of
15

CIT's evidence that CIT did not maliciously file its Notice of Default. RJW
Media's evidence was simply insufficient as a matter of law to proceed to the trial
phase.
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Fail to View the Evidence and
Reasonable Inferences From That Evidence in a Light Most
Favorable to RJW Media.

RJW Media claims that the trial court failed to "view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn there from in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party" because "after first recognizing that RJW Media possessed
'colorable' evidence of malice by CIT, the trial court then concluded that the
evidence was 'insufficient to merit the expense of a trail.'" Appellants Brief, p.
36.
In making its claim, RJW Media relies on a misrepresentation of the trial
court's holding. The trial court did not hold that RJW Media's evidence of malice
was colorable, but instead that its "claim" of malice was "colorable." R. 693.
Although a party to a suit may succeed in presenting a colorable claim, summary
judgment is still appropriate if the party fails to color the claim with evidence. In
other words, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 250.
Furthermore, even if RJW Media did present colorable evidence of malice,
"if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted." R. 687 quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. When
"the evidence is merely colorable," summary judgment is appropriate because
16

"there is no genuine issue if the evidence presented in the opposing
affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of
fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence' or whatever the
standard of proof may be in the case.
R. 687 quoting Anderson. 477 U.S. at 254. It is upon this evidentiary basis (as
opposed to the economic basis advanced by RJW Media) that the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of CIT. The trial court explicitly held:
[T]he court does not believe [RJW Media's] evidence could amount to the
realistic probability that [the trier of fact] would find malice in the issuance
of the notice of default by CIT.. . . Given the burden [RJW Media] bears to
prove slander of title . . . the evidence provided by [RJW Media] cannot
show malice. Thus, as a matter of law, [CIT] is entitled to judgment."
R. 693-94.
A review of the evidence presented by RJW Media, which is based almost
exclusively on the uncontested, internally consistent deposition testimony of CIT's
Vice President. Roy Stringfellow, reveals that the trial court was correct in holding
that RJW Media failed to present "significantly probative" evidence of express or
implied malice.
Instead of presenting evidence from any source other than CIT's VicePresident, RJW Media relies on its "colorable" claim that CIT acted in malice and
asks the court to negatively assess the credibility of Mr. Stringfellow in spite of its
own admonition that "[o]n summary judgment, the trial court must not weigh
evidence or assess credibility." Appellants brief on page 34, quoting Wasatch Oil
& Gas, LLC v. Reott 163 P.3d 713 (2007) (citations omitted). RJW Media
attempts to disguise this credibility assessment under the pretense of viewing the

17

evidence, as well as the reasonable inferences of the evidence, in a light most
favorable to its position.
RJW Media's request is untenable: if the witnesses of the party moving for
summary judgment are presumed to lack credibility (in the name of viewing the
evidence, and its reasonable inferences, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party), it is doubtful that any summary judgment motion could withstand scrutiny
because the moving party can always be presumed to have a "motive to deny." A
holding to that effect would make entirely unnecessary the U.S. Supreme Court's
declaration that "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The nonmoving party, without presenting sufficient
evidence, could defeat any summary judgment motion by merely averring that the
witnesses of the moving party lack credibility.
Fortunately, this is not the case: credibility assessments are proscribed and
reasonable inferences must be taken from the evidence itself. RJW Media failed
to produce evidence that CIT acted maliciously and CITs evidence was
completely consistent with its position that the sale of December 13, 2004 was
invalid. Had CIT's evidence regarding its intent been inconsistent in any respect,
then an inference could be made that CIT acted maliciously. Instead, CIT's
evidence concerning its intent was consistent and RJW Media's evidence of intent
(or perhaps more appropriately its lack thereof) was of "insufficient caliber or
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quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find," Id at 254, that CIT acted with
malice.
Thus, the trial court's holding was not based on its failure to view the
evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences based upon the evidence, in a light
most favorable to RJW Media. Instead, the trial court's holding was correctly
based on the fact that the trial court appropriately refrained from negatively
assessing the credibility of CIT5s witnesses and RJW Media failed to satisfy its
evidentiary burden to bring forth "significantly probative" evidence that CIT acted
maliciously in filing its notice of default. Id. at 264.
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PRESENTATION OF ISSUES RAISED BY CROSS APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE FOR REVIEW
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RJW MEDIA BY HOLDING THAT
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BARRED CIT FROM CHALLENGING
THE VALIDITY OF THE RJW MEDIA TRUSTEE'S SALE.
The issue for review is whether the trial court erred in granting RJW

Media's Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein the trial court held that CIT was
estopped from enforcing it Deed of Trust even though RJW Media's reliance of
CIT's silence as to the Notice of Cancellation was unreasonable and CIT did not
have a legal duty to inform RJW Media that the Notice of Default upon which
RJW Media relied to conduct its Trustee's Sale had been cancelled. This issue
was preserved for appeal in RJW Media's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R.
217-218], CIT's Opposition to RJW Media's Motion for Summary Judgment, [R.
352-363], and the District Court's September 22, 2006 Ruling and Order on that
Motion, R. 491-538.
In Utah, "summary judgment is appropriate when there is no issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Dairyland Ins. Co.., 882 P.2d at 1144, citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When
reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, [an appellate court] gives no deference
to the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews the issues presented under a
correctness standard. Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County
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167 P.3d 1080
(Utah 2007), citing Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharm., Inc., 2003 79 P.3d 922
(2003). Factual disputes are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (2000).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves claims by CIT that RJW Media conducted a void

Trustee's Sale on property to which CIT is a junior lien holder. R. 1-18. The
Cross-Appeal is from the trial court's Ruling and Order dated September 22, 2006,
granting summary judgment in favor of RJW Media's request to quiet title on a
theory of equitable estoppel. R. 491-538.
B.

Disposition in the Court Below

1.

RJW Media filed a Complaint on July 20, 2005, claiming the right to

declaratory relief and to quiet title to certain real property (the "Property") in RJW
Media's name. R. 1-18.
2.

A Temporary Restraining Order was issued on September 29, 2005 in favor

of RJW Media to prevent CIT from continuing its non-judicial foreclosure of its
junior trust deed on the Property.
3.

On September 7, 2005, the trial court heard arguments on the Temporary

Restraining Order and extended the Temporary Restraining Order until further
order of the Court. R. 93-97.
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4.

On September 22, 2006, the trial court granted RJW Media's Motion for

Summary Judgment against CIT, holding that CIT was barred by equitable
estoppel from challenging the validity of the RJW Media Trustee's Sale. R. 491538.
C.

Statement of Facts
1.

The Property is a large ski-in/ski-out residence identified by a

physical address of 2350 West Red Pine Court, located in Park City, Summit
County, Utah, and more particularly described as follows ("Property"):
LOT 3 DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATES SUBDIVISION,
PARCK CITY. UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT
THEREOF ON FILE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT
COUNTY RECORDER.
R. 595.
2.

On January 24, 2001, the Property was encumbered by a first deed

of trust executed in favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (the ''IndyMac Trust Deed").
R. 595.
3.

On August 30, 2002, the Property was encumbered by a second

deed of trust executed in favor of CIT (the "CIT Trust Deed"). R. 595.
4.

On April 28, 2003 the Debtor stopped making payments on the

promissory note that was secured by the CIT Trust Deed. (Ex. A - Deposition of
Roy Stringfellow, p. 55,11. 16-19). R. 595.
5.

IndyMac Bank issued a proper Notice of Default on the IndyMac

Trast Deed (the "Notice of Default")- (Ex. B-Notice of Default). R. 595.
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6.

On July 28, 2004, the IndyMac Note was assigned to RJW (the

"RJW Agreement"). (Ex. C - RJW Agreement). R. 595.
I.

Sometime before September 22, 2004, RJW Media performed a title

search on the Property and discovered the Notice of Default. R. 222.
8.

On September 22, 2004, First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah

("FSWT"), then the trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Cancellation of
the Notice of Default ("Cancellation"). (Ex. D - Cancellation of Notice of
Default). R. 595.
9.

November 9, 2004 was the first time that CIT was aware of the

Cancellation because it received a copy of the Cancellation. (Ex. A - Deposition
of Roy Stringfellow, p. 29,11. 1-14.) R. 596.
10.

On November 12, 2004, Blake Parrish ("Parrish"), as Successor

Trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the
Property (the "Notice of Trustee's Sale") without performing a title search on the
Property to ensure that the procedural steps to foreclose on the property had been
taken, particularly whether the Notice of Default had been cancelled. R. 596.
II.

On the 19th of November CIT learned for the first time that IndyMac

had assigned the IndyMac Note to RJW. (Ex. A - Deposition of Roy Stringfellow,
p. 33,11. 8-21.) R. 596.
12.

After being informed by Foreclosurelink, CIT's foreclosure and

default servicing agent, about the Cancellation, CIT:
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A.

had Foreclosurelink provide it with an updated title report to

confirm whether a new notice if default had been recorded subsequent to
the Cancellation,
B.

asked Foreclosurelink to obtain a payoff from RJW, and

C.

had Foreclosurelink monitor title so if a new Notice of

Default was filed CIT could respond correctly. (Ex. A - Deposition of Roy
Stringfellow, p. 38,11. 14-21, p. 41 11. 13-16, & p. 44 11. 19-23.) R. 596.
13.

CIT determined that because of the Cancellation, the foreclosure sale

scheduled for December 13, 2004 was void for lack of authority of the trustee.
Thus, it decided not to bid at the void sale. (Ex. A - Deposition of Roy
Stringfellow, p. 45,11. 9-12, p. 47 11. 13-18, & p. 63 11. 7-9.) R. 596.
14.

In his capacity as the Successor Trustee, Parrish, after becoming

trustee, never conducted a title search to ensure that the title conditions would
allow for the Trustee's Sale to be valid. R. 325.
15.

Had Parrish conducted a date down search, RJW Media would have

discovered that the Notice of Default to which it relied for authorization to
conduct its Trustee's Sale had been cancelled by FSWT's filing of the
Cancellation. R. 325.
16.

RJW conducted the Trustee's Sale on December 13, 2004 at 11:00

a.m. R. 596.
17.

RJW was the highest bidder at the Trustee's Sale. R. 596.
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18.

After the Trustee's Sale, CIT received notice that the Trustee's Sale

had in fact occurred. CIT considered the sale to be invalid because of the
Cancellation deprived the Trustee of authority to conduct the sale. (Ex. A Deposition of Roy Stringfellow, p. 55,11. 2-5. R. 596.
19.

CIT then waited to file its own notice of default until April, 2005

because it assumed RJW would discover Cancellation and restart the foreclosure
process by filing a new notice of default and conducting an authorized sale. (Ex.
A - Deposition of Roy Stringfellow, p. 57,11. 21-25.) R. 596.
20.

When RJW did not re-commence the foreclosure process, CIT filed

its own Notice of Default ("CIT Notice of Default"). (Ex. A - Deposition of Roy
Stringfellow, p. 56,11. 23-25 & p. 57,11. 1-8.). R. 596.
21. This action was commenced by RJW in response to the CIT Notice of
Default. R. 1-18.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL BARRED CIT FROM CHALLENGING THE
VALIDITY OF THE RJW MEDIA TRUSTEE'S SALE.
The trial court erred in at least two respects in relying on the principle of

equitable estoppel to grant summary judgment in RJW Media's favor on RJW
Media's quieting of title claim: (1) in light of industry standards concerning
Trustee's Sale foreclosures, RJW Media's reliance of CIT's silence regarding the
Notice of Cancellation was unreasonable; and (2) CIT did not have a legal duty to
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inform RJW Media of the Cancellation's invalidating effect upon the Notice of
Default that RJW Media relied on to conduct its void Trustee's Sale.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING CIT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SEEKING DISMISSAL OF RJW
MEDIA'S COMPLAINT, BECAUSE THE TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS
VOID AND CIT IS ENTITLED TO ENFORCE ITS DEED OF
TRUST.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-24 (2007),
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified under
Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until:
(1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of the recorder of
each county where the trust property or some part or parcel of the
trust property is situated, a notice of default...

By failing to record a notice of default after the Cancellation, the trustee's
sale of December 13, 2004, was void because the trustee had no authority
to conduct the sale. Since the sale was void, CIT is authorized to proceed
with foreclosure of its Deed of Trust.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL BARRED CIT FROM CHALLENGING THE
VALIDITY OF THE RJW MEDIA TRUSTEE'S SALE.
The trial court erred in at least two respects in relying on the principle of

equitable estoppel to grant summary judgment in RJW Media's favor on RJW
Media's quieting of title claim: (1) in light of industry standards concerning
Trustee's Sale foreclosures, RJW Media's reliance of CIT's silence regarding the
Notice of Cancellation was unreasonable; and (2) CIT did not have a legal duty to
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inform RJW Media of the Cancellation's invalidating effect upon the Notice of
Default that RJW Media relied on to conduct its void Trustee's Sale.
A.

RJW Media's Reliance on CIT's Silence Concerning the Notice
of Cancellation was Unreasonable.

The purpose and elements of equitable estoppel were summarized in CECO
Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.:
Estoppel is an equitable defense that requires proof of three elements: (i) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act,
or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act.
772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
The trial court, in focusing on CIT's lack of communication with RJW
Media, failed to recognize the importance of RJW Media's unreasonable failure to
discover the Cancellation itself. The Utah Supreme Court has explained, "[u]nder
our caselaw, a party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or acts if
they are contrary to his knowledge of the truth or if he had the means by which
with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the truth." Youngblood v. AutoOwners Inc. Co., 158 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2007) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
The undisputed facts set forth that CIT, although headquartered in
Oklahoma, was able to discover the Cancellation nearly five weeks before the sale.
R. 596. Since the Cancellation was a public record available at the Summit
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County Recorders Office, CIT, like any other interested person, simply ordered a
title report to determine title conditions and make a decision about the status and
validity of RJW's foreclosure. R. 596.
RJW, was at no disadvantage to CIT. Indeed, RJW's trustee was
steadfastly quartered in a dedicated law office in Summit County and in
connection with RJW Media's purchase of the IndyMac Deed of Trust, Mr.
Parrish obtained a title report on September 9, 2004. R. 222. Although RJW
Media and the trustee obtained no further title reports or updates, they have never
claimed that they were prevented from obtaining any searching the public
documents or otherwise receiving additional reports or updates. More
importantly, if the Trustee had been acting with prudence and due care, he would
have ordered title reports and updates on at least two additional occasions.
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. CIT included the Affidavit
of Melven E. Smith. R. 352-363. Mr. Smith is a licensed attorney with
considerable experience in conducting foreclosure of Trust Deeds. R. 352-363,
Affidavit of Melven Smith ^f 3. RJW never contradicted or objected to Mr.
Smith's sworn testimony regarding the industry practice for foreclosing Deeds of
Trust. Hence the only testimony before the trial court and this Court concerning
industry standards for trust deed foreclosure is that of Mr. Smith, who states that
industry practice requires a trustee to check status of title at least twice in the
foreclosure process:
1) the trustee obtains a title report when a Substitution of Trustee is filed; and
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2) the trustee obtains an updated title report thirty (30) days before sale to
confirm whether federal tax liens have been recorded. R. 352-363,
Affidavit of Melven Smith If 10 & 11.
Mr. Smith advises the first title search is confirm status of title at the
beginning of the process, to discover any claims or encumbrances which "could
affect the validity of the sale." R. 352-363, Affidavit of Melven Smith If 10. The
second check is to ensure compliance with federal law and tax regulations. R.
352-363, Affidavit of Melven Smith If 11.
An initial check of title is warranted to confirm such things as proper
identification of the beneficiary, the presence of prior notices of default or
cancellations, and other title defects or conditions. R. 352-363, Affidavit of
Melven Smith ^j 10. Where a trustee performs this review, the clear purpose is to
allow the foreclosure process can proceed without future need to correct initial
title defects. The second check, thirty days before, sale, serves a similar purpose.
Under federal law, property being sold through a non-judical sale, such as a
trust deed foreclosure, may be subjected to a federal tax lien, if the tax lien is
recorded more that 30 days prior to the sale. 26 USC 7425(b). If the date down
discloses a federal tax lien, then the Trustee conducting the sale sends a copy of
the notice of the sale to the Secretary of the Treasury at least 25 prior to the sale.
26 USC 7425(b) & (c)(1). If a trustee fails to provide notice of the sale to the
Secretary of Treasury, then, unless the Secretary consents to the sale, title
transferred at the sale shall remain subject to the tax lien claim of the United
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States. 26 USC 7425(c)(2). In order to convey the property free of federal tax
liens, the trustee must check title and take appropriate action to notify the federal
government of the pending foreclosure.
While these federal provisions do not mandate that a trustee search title,
prudence dictates that a trustee interested in properly conducting a sale will do a
thirty day date down to make sure any federal tax liens are properly managed.
Here the trustee had the means by which with reasonable diligence it could
ascertain the fact that the Notice of Default was cancelled. If the trustee had
followed industry standards and federal law by checking the Property's title report,
the Cancellation would have been discovered. Thus, the trustee's duty and
obligation to check the title report made it unreasonable for RJW Media to rely on
CIT's silence and it was inappropriate to estopp CIT from enforcing its Deed of
Trust. Therefore, the second element of estoppel is not met.
In addition to acting unreasonably, RJW Media, has not presented any
evidence that it will be injured if the sale is set aside. In fact, the evidence is to the
contrary. As part of its transaction for purchase of the IndyMac Note and Trust
Deed, RJW Media also received a Special Warranty Deed conveying fee title of
the Property to RJW Media. At the sale, RJW Media, by credit bid, "purchased"
title to property which it already owned, provided however, that the post-sale title,
if valid, was not subject to the CIT Deed of Trust. Since RJW Media expended no
money at the sale and obtained no title or estate greater than what it had prior to
the sale, it did not detrimentally act in reliance on CIT's failure to disclose the
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recording of the Cancellation. Likewise, if this Court overturns the trial Court and
grants CIT's motion for summary judgment, RJW Media will still have title to the
Property through the Special Warranty Deed, it will still own the IndyMac note
and Deed of Trust which it can foreclose against itself and CIT. Since RJW Media
will not be injured, it cannot meet the third element of its estoppel claim.
B.

The Principal of Equitable Estoppel Requires that the Party
Being Estopped Have a Duty to Act

The trial Court concluded that CITs acquiescence to the sale with full
knowledge of the Cancellation, prevents CIT from objecting to the sale now. R.
505. CIT did not issue any statements, make any admissions, or commit any acts
that were misleading or inconsistent with its belief that the Notice of Default relied
upon by RJW Media had been invalidated by the Cancellation. In spite of the fact
that CIT did not have a duty to inform RJW Media that the Cancellation rendered
its Trustee's Sale void, the trial court found that CIT's inaction should estopp CIT
from enforcing its Deed of Trust. It is against fairness and equitable sensibilities
to hold that a party can rely on another's silence absent some duty to notify. This
is the position espoused by Corpus Juris Secundum:
Where nonaction or passivity is relied on to create an estoppel, it must
appear that the party to be estopped was under a duty to act under the
circumstances, or, as is sometimes declared, was bound in equity and good
conscience actively to evidence his intention not to be bound by the
transaction, that he had an opportunity so to act, and that there was some
element of turpitude or negligence connected with the inaction by which
the other was misled to his injury.
31 C.SJ. Estoppel and Waiver § 135 (Database updated June 2007).
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RJW Media and the trial court relied heavily upon the case of American
Falls Canal Securites v. American Savings & Loan Association, 775 P.2d 412
(Utah 1989) for the proposition that CIT had a duty to notify RJW Media of the
Cancellation or take some action to challenge the sale. In American Falls, the
Supreme Court estopped a prior owner of property from asserting a claim for
excess proceeds, where the prior owner knew, more than thirty days prior to sale,
of the lenders intention to bid the entire amount principal, interest and fee amount
due; the disparity between the lenders intended bid and the lesser amount the
owner thought the lender was entitled for the property, and the owner failed to
disclose such disparity to the lender prior to, or at the sale. Id. at 414.
In stating the rule, the Court held that estoppel can be applied to the trust
deed foreclosure process, when, "a party otherwise in a position to object to a
mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded from doing so based upon
conduct sufficient to bring into operation the doctrines of waiver and estoppel."
Id. And the conduct sufficient to bring estoppel into action includes, "one who
knowingly and silently permits another to expend money on land, under a belief
that he has title, will not be permitted to set up his own right to the exclusion of
the rights of the one who made the improvements, finds application in a variety of
ways where land has been sold under invalid foreclosure proceedings." Id. (citing
55 Am.Jur.2d Mortgages, § 861). Therefore, silence which may prejudice a
purchaser can give rise to an estoppel, "[EJxcept where non-compliance results in
a complete legal nullity..." Id., (citing 55 Am.Jur.2d Mortgages, § 862).
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As previously noted, RJW Media owns title to the property through the
Special Warranty Deed, and owns the note and trust deed upon which its sale was
predicated, so it will not suffer an injury if the sale is set aside, it will still own the
property. Moreover, the Cancellation cancelled the notice of default and deprived
the trustee of authority to sell the Property. The trustee's subsequent failure to
record a notice of default is non-compliance which makes the sale a legal nullity.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
CANCELLATION DID NOT VOID THE SALE.
A non-judicial foreclosure of a trust deed is a legal right and a legal process

authorized and conducted exclusively by statute. Therefore, a non-judicial
foreclosure sale is valid only if the trustee obtains authority as set forth in the
statute. To do so, the trustee must file a Notice of Default and thereby obtain the
power of sale.
The unequivocal language of the statute declares:
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of default.
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee who is qualified
under Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv) may not be exercised until:
(1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of the recorder of
each county where the trust property or some part or parcel of the
trust property is situated, a notice of default, identifying the trust
deed by stating the name of the trustor named in the trust deed and
giving the book and page, or the recorder's entry number, where the
trust deed is recorded and a legal description of the trust property,
and containing a statement that a breach of an obligation for which
the trust property was conveyed as security has occurred, and setting
forth the nature of that breach and of the trustee's election to sell or
cause to be sold the property to satisfy the obligation;
(emphasis added).
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When interpreting a statute, this Court has stated, "When we interpret a
statute, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by
the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. We
reach this goal by first looking to the plain language of a statute to determine its
meaning, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same
chapter and related chapters. Only upon finding that the plain language is
ambiguous do we proceed to look to other interpretive tools." Sachs v. Lesser,
163 P.3d 662, 673 ^ 37 (Utah App. 2007) (quotations omitted and internal
citations omitted).
Under the plain language of the foregoing statute, a trustee has no authority
to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale, unless the trustee records a notice of
default. The undisputed facts of this case show that there was not valid notice of
default filed by the trustee, Blake Parrish, or pending at the time of sale. Prior to
Parrish becoming the successor trustee, IndyMac instructed the trustee, First
Southwestern Title to cancel the notice of default. R. 325. Subsequently, RJW
Media had Blake Parrish substitute as trustee. R. 325. Parrish did not file a notice
of default because he never updated his title report, and therefore, did not have the
authority to conduct the sale. R. 325.
In denying CIT's Motion for Summary Judgment the trial court did not
focus on the statutory mandate for a trustee to record a notice of default but
instead relied on case law to equitably amend the statute and remove the notice of
default obligation. To do so was in error.
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To sustain its opinion, the trial court relied upon case law explaining
circumstances under which a trustee's sale is voidable. Specifically, the trial court
stated that, "notice defects or irregularities that would allow for the setting aside a
trustee's sale must be those that 'would have the effect of chilling the bidding and
causing an inadequacy of the price.'" R. 505 citing Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P.3d
699 (Utah 2003), quoting Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Services, Inc., 743
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). However, reliance upon caselaw which provides a
rationale for analyzing a defective sale should not be relied in circumstances
where the error was a failure to obtain the authority to conduct a sale, rather than
an error in the administration of the sale.
Notably, the trial court relied upon Concepts and its progeny, i.e. Timm,
and Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App.
1990), and these cases arise from circumstances where the foreclosure sales at
issue were conducted with a valid notice of default, but the alleged irregularity
was in either: 1) a defect in the Notice of Sale itself (Concepts), 2) the timing of
the notice of sale (Occidental), or the service of the notice of sale (Timm). As a
result, there was no claim in any of those cases that the sale was void for lack of
authority. Thus, these rulings are inapplicable to circumstances such as those at
bar where the question is the trustee's authority to initiate and conduct the
foreclosure process, not the trustee's conduct in administering the process. Based
upon the plain language of the statute, the sale was void because the Cancellation
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eliminated the authority for the sale to be conducted until a new and valid notice
of default was recorded.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
CANCELLATION DID NOT CHILL THE BIDDING.
As previously noted in this memorandum, when the trial court concluded

the First Southwestern Title acted reasonably when it recorded the Cancellation,
the natural effect of that conclusion is that the Cancellation cancelled the notice of
default and voided the sale. If this Court agrees with that conclusion of the trial
court, then CIT will be entitled to summary judgment and allowed to proceed with
enforcement of its Deed of Trust.
But if this Court overturns the trial Court and concludes First Southwestern
Title erred in recording the Cancellation, CIT is still entitled to Summary
Judgment, because the presence of the Cancellation was an irregularity that chilled
the bidding. See Concepts, 743 P.2d 1158, 1159.
In Concepts, the Court analyzed several cases from various jurisdictions to
fashion its rule for setting aside a foreclosure sale. After its review, the Court
concluded that trust deed foreclosure sales could be set aside where an irregularity
existed in the foreclosure process which was sufficient to chill the bidding.
Among those analyzed by the Supreme Court in Concepts was the matter of
Booker v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 175 Miss. 281, 164 So. 877 (1936).
In Booker, the sale was challenged on the basis that the date of the sale published
in the newspaper was different than the date of the sale posted on the notice at the
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courthouse. The Mississippi statute required both publication and posting of the
notice. The notice posted at the Courthouse on August 6, 1934, listed the sale date
as July 11, 1934, while the published notice listed to correct date of August 29,
1934.
In voiding the sale, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated,
We are of the opinion that the sale, as well as the deed thereunder,
was void, for the reason that, substantially, no notice of the sale was
ever posted at the courthouse door. This record shows that the
impossible past date of sale- the 11th day of July, 1934-was named
as the date on which the sale would be had, which gave the public
and interested parties no notice whatever. It was equivalent to a
failure to post any notice at the courthouse, as required by the
statute, and a failure in a most material particular, to give notice of
the sale, a most necessary and important part in such a procedure.
Booker, 164 So. at 879.
By analogy, the cancellation of a notice of default under our statute is the
equivalent of having no notice of default at all, and deprives the trustee of
authority to conduct the sale. By legislative mandate, the trustee has no authority
to conduct a sale until a Notice of Default is recorded. The corollary is that the
trustee has no authority to conduct a sale if the Notice of Default is cancelled.
Accordingly for the trustee to proceed with a sale, where the Notice of Default is
cancelled, is an irregularity which chills the bidding. After all, CIT knew the
Notice of Default had been cancelled and on the basis of that irregularity, chose
not to attend the sale and bid. R. 596.
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Moreover, the trustee admitted the cancellation chilled the bidding, at least
as to anyone but CIT. In his deposition the trustee answered the questions as
follows:
Q.

If bidder looked at [the Cancellation] and came to the conclusion
that the sale you had noticed for December 13 was not valid because
the Notice of Default had been cancelled and they chose not to bid,
would that be a reasonable conclusion?

THE WITNESS: I think it depends on who the party is. If the party is CIT,
who is actively engaged in the negotiations for the purchase of their note
and also has actual knowledge that the sale's going forward, then I would
say "no". That—it would not be sufficient in the instance. For someone
else that did, it may be.
(Deposition of Blake Parrish, pp. 124-125) R. 359-60.
In questioning about the effect of the Cancellation of the validity of the
sale, the trustee similarly equivocated:
Q.

If Exhibit 9 were a valid Cancellation of Notice of Default, would
that mean the sale you held I believe on December 13, 2004, would
be invalid?

THE WITNESS: I think it may be invalid as to some parties and valid as to
others.
Q.

Which parties do you think that the sale would be valid as to and
which would it be invalid as to?

A.

Parties other than the debtor who has actual notice of the sale and
opportunity to bid.

(Deposition of Blake Parrish, pp. 121-122). R. 359-60.
The trustee acknowledges that presence of the Cancellation would chill the
bidding, because at least some parties with knowledge of the Cancellation would
be acting reasonably if they chose not to bid because the sale would be void and
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they would have defective title. R. 359-60. This conclusion squarely frames the
central issue of this litigation: The impact of the Cancellation on the quality of
title4.
When a person purchases property at a trustee's sale, the recitals in a
trustees deed proclaiming compliance with the statutory requirements only create a
presumption of validity. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-l-28(2)(c). If there is a defect in
the notices or process that subsequently renders the sale void, the purchaser can
make no claim against the prior owner, the trustee, or any other party. On a
property such as that in question, where the bid price was going to be in the range
of $2 million dollars, a party paying that price would risk a loss of title to the
property if he purchased and the Court subsequently determined that the
Cancellation rendered the sale void. Therefore it is completely reasonable for a
party who knew of the Cancellation not to risk spending $2 million, because the
legitimacy of the sale and the quality of the title were in question.
Since quality of title is of central importance to providing an adequate price
by encouraging and obtaining legitimate bids from confident bidders, the Court
When one attempts to either prove or disprove that a nonjudicial foreclosure was
made in compliance with the statutes and with the deed of trust or mortgage, a
problem arises which is not present in a judicial foreclosure. In a judicial
foreclosure, the court record via the judgment roll is available to prove the
borrower's default, notices, and the conduct and confirmation of the sale. There is
also a presumption of the regularity of the proceedings. On the other hand, in a
nonjudicial sale, there is no court supervision and no court record to prove the
default, and to prove that the notices, advertisements, and sale were properly
made. At the same time, property is being transferred and property interests are
being foreclosed with the pressing need for the resulting titles to be stable. Law of
Distressed Real Estate, § 17:2I.Thomson/West (2005).
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cannot sustain an exception which will leave the continuity and uniformity of the
statutory process in question. Therefore CIT was reasonable in relying on the
record when it elected not to attend and bid on property with defective title.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons CIT requests that the Court reverse the trial
Court's order estopping CIT from enforcing its Deed of Trust, grant CIT's Motion
for Summary Judgment and enter an Order voiding the sale. CIT further requests
that the Court sustain the trial courts Order granting CIT Summary Judgment on
its motion to dismiss RJW Media's claim for Slander of Title.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this x±_ day of October. 2007.

DANA T. FARMER
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
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